Western Michigan University

ScholarWorks at WMU
Political Science Faculty Publications

Political Science

11-2006

From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation
Grants Redefined Relations between Political Theory and Social
Science in the 1950s
Emily Hauptmann
Western Michigan University, emily.hauptmann@wmich.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/politics_pubs
Part of the Political Science Commons

WMU ScholarWorks Citation
Hauptmann, Emily, "From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation Grants Redefined
Relations between Political Theory and Social Science in the 1950s" (2006). Political Science Faculty
Publications. 3.
https://scholarworks.wmich.edu/politics_pubs/3

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by
the Political Science at ScholarWorks at WMU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Political Science Faculty
Publications by an authorized administrator of
ScholarWorks at WMU. For more information, please
contact wmu-scholarworks@wmich.edu.

American Political Science Review

Vol. 100, No. 4

November 2006

From Opposition to Accommodation: How Rockefeller Foundation
Grants Redefined Relations between Political Theory and Social
Science in the 1950s
EMILY HAUPTMANN

Western Michigan University

I

n this essay, I rely primarily on unpublished documents from the Rockefeller Foundation Archives as
well as the annual reports of the Ford Foundation and the Social Science Research Council (SSRC)
to show that rather than being in a torpor, political theory in the 1950s was a large and eclectic
field, marked by contest and rapid change. I focus on the Rockefeller Foundation’s policy making for
its program in Legal and Political Philosophy (LAPP), the largest grant program for political theory in
the 1950s, both to see how the Foundation justified the creation of the program and how it defined its
scope. I argue that when faced with the task of settling on a working definition of “political theory” for
the purpose of awarding grants, the Foundation’s officers and the academics who assisted them opted,
after prolonged debate, for an eclectic definition of political theory. I read the emergence of this eclectic
definition of political theory, however, not as evidence of pacific pluralism but as an attempt to contain
some of the new challenges to the field by incorporating them into it, albeit in a subordinate position.

I

t has become a commonplace in recent synopses of
the history of political theory in the United States to
say that the field was in a deep decline in the 1950s,
perhaps even dead. This story, now widely accepted
as an uncontroversial account of the history of the
discipline, continues to gain power through frequent
retellings (Barry 1980; Connolly 2001). There are, however, a number of reasons to revise it. For one, some
of those who pronounced political theory in decline
in the 1950s did so in a strategic, critical spirit: what
they claimed was dying—–fine-grained commentary on
the history of political thought—–was what they wished
dead (Easton 1951). And when others asked whether
political theory was still alive, they did so not because
they feared its imminent demise but to examine what
motivated the question and then to affirm the vitality
and importance of political theory to those who challenged it (Berlin [1963] 1979, Laslett 1956). In later
decades, the fierce contest that marked political theory
in the 1950s was rarely noted; instead, stories about the
sorry state of political theory in the 1950s were more “a
prelude to the celebration of its rebirth” than thorough
historical reassessments (Adcock and Bevir 2003, 1).
What is more, unpublished records from the 1950s do
not support a story of decline; rather, they reveal a
deep and sustained commitment to political theory in
the United States on the part of many academics and
several private funding agencies.
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THE GROWTH OF EXTERNAL FUNDING FOR
ACADEMIC RESEARCH
In the years immediately following World War II, universities in the United States received huge infusions
of grant money from the federal government and private foundations.1 Not only was the amount of money
coming in enormous, but also it was unprecedented;
never before had the federal government or private
foundations spent so much money on academic research. As several recent studies have shown (Becher
and Trowler 2001; Lowen 1997; Roelofs 2003; Simpson
1998; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004), universities, along
with many of the disciplines they housed, were profoundly transformed by this massive influx of external
funding.
Not surprisingly, the academics who received the
most of this money belonged to the “hard sciences”
and conducted research related to the development of
new weapons systems (Lowen 1997, 2, 6–13; Slaughter and Rhoades 2004, 28–29). But social scientists,
though they received significantly less money as a
group than did their colleagues in physics, did not
go begging (Dahl 1961, 765). Some of the most lavishly supported fields in the social sciences were game
and decision theory as well as quantitative analysis of
political behavior (Amadae 2003; Lowen 1997, 191–
223; SSRC Annual Reports 1952–1961). Although they
provided the dominant rationale for the funding of
academic research during the 1950s, Cold War imperatives did not dictate the shape of every grant program
developed during the decade.2 A case in point is the
Rockefeller Foundation’s program in Legal and
1 It is difficult to specify how much money the federal government
poured into universities, given that much of it was not publicly disclosed or was funneled through other entities, like private foundations (Needell 1998, 25).
2 But see Reisch (2005), who makes a compelling case that foundation support, informed by Cold War imperatives, depoliticized and
thereby fundamentally transformed even the unlikely field of the
philosophy of science in the United States in the 1950s.
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Political Philosophy (LAPP). Rather than being designed primarily as part of a Cold War, anti-communist
mission, LAPP was created in part to counterbalance
the much larger sums being granted to behavioral social
scientists by other private foundations and by Rockefeller itself. It was therefore meant to intervene in what
its directors saw as a period of rapid and fundamental
change in the discipline of political science. Particularly
after both the federal government and the Ford Foundation dramatically increased their levels of funding
for academic research in the early 1950s, scholars and
foundation officers alike sensed that a sea change in
the social sciences—–brought on by the sudden surge
of money available for certain kinds of projects—–was
imminent. This was context in which the Rockefeller
Foundation first conceived of creating a program to
support political philosophy.3

FOUNDATION FUNDING FOR POLITICAL
THEORY AND POLITICAL SCIENCE IN
THE 1950s
Over the 10 years of its life (from 1953 to 1962),
Rockefeller’s program in legal and political philosophy
awarded just under $1.7 million in grants and fellowships; of this money, $258,750 went to the Social Science
Research Council to administer a fellowship program
for advanced graduate students and $380,000 to three
departments for their own programs in political theory (The Rockefeller Foundation, Program in Legal
and Political Philosophy, n.d., folder 80, box 9, series
910, RG 3, RFA, RAC).4 Significant though these sums
were, they were a fraction both of what the Rockefeller
Foundation itself allotted to behavioral social science and what other foundations, most notably Ford,
spent on behavioral social science (Deane to Willits,
February 6, 1953, pp. 1–3, 76:8, RAC-1; Ford Foundation Annual Report 1957, 32–33).5 Although Ford

3 Although “political philosophy” was the given name of the field
supported by LAPP, most involved with the program regularly substitute “political theory” for “political philosophy.” Herbert Deane,
the first consultant hired to develop LAPP, presented a possible
way of distinguishing between “political philosophy” and “political
theory” to Joseph Willits, Director of the Division of Social Sciences
(Deane to Willits, October 22, 1952, folder 74, box 8, series 910,
RG 3, RFA, RAC); that distinction, however, was never taken up by
others involved with the program. And “political theory” became the
most common name for the field with which LAPP was concerned.
There were also early discussions of the part legal philosophy ought
to play in the new program; many of these, however, concluded
that few legal scholars wished to interrupt their careers to take a
fellowship. Funding work in legal philosophy was never a significant
part of LAPP. See John B. Stewart to Leland C. DeVinney, “The
Legal Philosophy Phase of LAPP,” October 27, 1954, folder 78, box
9, series 910, R.G. 3, RFA, RAC.
4 In subsequent references, all material from series 910 is cited as
RAC-1. References to folder and box numbers are also abbreviated,
so that folder 80, box 9 becomes 80:9.
5 Over the 6 years of its life (1952–1957), the Ford Foundation’s
program in Behavioral Sciences awarded around $24 million in grants
to institutions; $10 million for the endowment of the Center for
Advanced Studies in Behavioral Sciences in Menlo Park, California.
According to Deane to Willits, February 6, 1953, p. 1, Rockefeller’s
Division of Social Sciences (DSS) had in 1950 divided up its budget

644

November 2006

and Carnegie each supported some work in political
theory, neither developed a program devoted solely to
the field, focusing its spending on other areas instead.6
The SSRC also had a number of other active fellowship
programs during this period, many of which (like the
Committee on Political Behavior or the Committee on
Mathematical Training for Social Scientists) appear to
have been far more active and well-funded than the
committee responsible for LAPP fellowships (SSRC
Annual Reports, 1952–1961).7 Once it began LAPP,
the Rockefeller Foundation was therefore the principal funder of political theory in the 1950s and the only
Foundation with a program devoted to the field; the
SSRC played a secondary part in supporting political
theory by administering a portion of the Rockefellerfinanced program.
One of the most important questions facing those
who crafted LAPP was a straightforward, practical one:
how to define the fields the program was being designed
to aid? That is, what sorts of projects were to count as
examples of legal and political philosophy? LAPP was
created in the early 1950s, a time when the identity of
“political theory” in the discipline was inchoate and
the behavioral revolution was just beginning. Examining how the Rockefeller Foundation went about trying
to define the fields LAPP was designed to support,
therefore, serves as a window onto what proved to be
a period of rapid change within the discipline.
In what follows, I focus on policy making by the
Rockefeller Foundation during the early years of the
LAPP program, drawing on correspondence among
Foundation officers and records of conferences among
appointed advisory committees of academics. The officers most directly concerned with the new program
focus both on characterizing its scope as well as its place
within the constellation of all the other programs sponsored by the foundation’s social sciences division. The
first policy making conference, held in the fall of 1952,
was intended to help officers make the case for the need
for the program as well as to sketch the parameters of
the kinds of work such a program might support. The
second, convened by the Rockefeller Foundation and
the SSRC in the fall of 1954, sought to define what
as follows: “35 per cent of DSS budget to develop a science of social
behavior, 35 per cent to foster the application of the social sciences to
certain social problems, 20 per cent for assistance to talent through
fellowships, etc., and 10 per cent for social philosophy.” Deane argued
that LAPP should be financed out of the 10 percent of the division’s
budget allocated to social philosophy.
6 For example, some political theorists (like Leo Strauss, whose
project I discuss below) received funding from Ford’s Behavioral
Sciences program, even though support for political theory was not
central to the mission of the program. Also, the Carnegie Corporation supported a conference on “Political Theory and the Study of
Politics,” held at Northwestern University in 1955. A summary of the
conference, by Harry Eckstein (1956), appears in the Review.
7 According the financial statements provided in the SSRC’s Annual
reports from 1952 to 1961, the Committee on Political Behavior
spent roughly $157,000 on research activities (including conferences,
training institutes and research projects, but excluding fellowships);
the Committee on the Mathematical Training for Social Scientists
(later renamed Mathematics in Social Science Research), roughly
$215,000. By contrast, the Committee for LAPP spent no money on
research.
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kinds of projects the newly established SSRC phase of
the LAPP program would fund. All the participants in
each of these phases of the foundation’s policy making
for LAPP confronted several basic issues: what the relation between political theory and social science was
and ought to become; and which approaches to political
theory merited the most support.

FOUNDATION SUPPORT FOR POLITICAL
THEORY: MAKING THE CASE
In 1952, Joseph Willits, Director of the Division of
Social Sciences at the Rockefeller Foundation, began
soliciting comments from academics on the need for a
program in legal and political philosophy. A conference
was convened to discuss the design of the new program
in the fall of 1952. Shortly thereafter, Louis Hartz of
Harvard wrote to Willits to underscore the relative lack
of outside support for work in political theory: “[T]here
is one concrete issue which this Conference has gotten
hold of and which I would be reluctant to see forgotten.
This is the fact, familiar to almost anyone working in
universities in political science, that men working in
the theory field are at an enormous disadvantage when
it comes to the allocation of research funds” (Hartz to
Willits, November 6, 1952, 75:8, RAC-1). Other participants made similar observations; Robert MacIver
echoed Hartz’s point and noted that Franz Neumann,
his colleague at Columbia, had made it as well. He went
on to say, “the most promising students [in political theory] find it next to impossible to get the aid in the way
of research scholarships and fellowships that would be
possible had they presented projects of the type, for
example, that are acceptable to the SSRC” (MacIver
to Willits, November 7, 1952, 75:8, RAC-1). Another
participant, Frederick Watkins of Yale, wrote to urge
the Foundation to begin a program in this area, but
to regard it as a “speculative investment,” the returns
of which might not be seen for years, if ever: “Can a
responsible foundation afford, in addition to its more
readily defensible expenditures, to risk an occasional
mad splurger [sic] in American Tel. and Tel.?” (Watkins
to Willits, November 12, 1952, 75: 8, RAC-1). By comparing the “investment” Rockefeller was considering
making in political theory to buying stock in AT&T,
Watkins was suggesting that though it might seem risky
now, such a program might prove as shrewd as early
investments in AT&T had been.
Bolstered by such comments about the effects of the
dearth in funding for work in political theory, those
who crafted LAPP emphasized that it was meant to
be a counterweight to social science. Notably, Herbert
A. Deane, the consultant hired by the Foundation to
oversee the creation of LAPP, contended that the neglect of theory had led to a dangerous kind of cultural illiteracy—–a development many social scientists
recognized and deplored, though they were “unaware
that they and their imitators bear any share of the responsibility for the rise of this new barbarism” (Deane
to Willits, January 12, 1953, pp. 1, 2, 76:8, RAC-1).
Although LAPP ultimately became an eclectic pro-
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gram that sponsored a number of projects informed by
behavioral social science, its principal architects were
young Columbia-trained theorists determined to counteract what they saw as the ever-increasing power of
social scientific approaches to the study of politics.8

INFILTRATING THE SSRC
Shortly after LAPP was first established in 1953, several people within Rockefeller’s Division of Social Sciences (DSS), including Willits, its head, suggested that
the program fund fellowships for advanced graduate
students and that these fellowships be administered by
the SSRC. Although Willits strongly favored such a
plan, he acknowledged that others had good reason
to be wary of it, especially because “the SSRC has
shown a decided lack of sympathy in helping men in
these fields of inquiry” (Minutes of Division of Social
Sciences Staff Meeting, Legal and Political Philosophy,
October 9, 1953, p. 4, 77: 8, RAC-1). Still, Willits argued
that it would be worth the Foundation’s while to insist
upon the SSRC administering the program. Among
the many reasons Willits cited to support his view, he
noted, “[t]here are also advantages to the theory of
infiltration. There might be an advantage in pushing the
SSRC and thus through infiltration an interest might
be established in this area of study and research at the
SSRC” (Minutes, p. 5).
Informed by a similar spirit, the grant action that
announced the first appropriation to the SSRC for this
fellowship program a few months later represented the
relation between political theory and social science as a
conflict between parties of unequal strength: “Concern
has been expressed by many persons, chiefly laymen,
but also academicians, at the consistent spread of the
assumption that the scientific study of social phenomena is enough, and at the increasing neglect by our
generation of those political values on which our society was founded, attention to which is necessary if
wisdom is to be realized” (Social Science Research
Council—–Fellowships in Legal and Political Philosophy, Grant Action RF 53181, December 1–2, 1953,
2470:255, series 200E, RG 1.2, RFA, RAC).9 Not surprisingly, John B. Stewart, the newly hired consultant
in charge of LAPP for the Foundation, reported a few
months later that many at the SSRC were not happy
8 During its early life, Herbert A. Deane and John B. Stewart were
principally responsible for creating and shaping LAPP. Deane was
a Ph.D. candidate at Columbia University during the time of his
service; Stewart received his Ph.D. from Columbia in 1953. Deane
(born in 1921) served as a consultant to Social Sciences from 1952
to 1954; Stewart (born in 1924) served for several terms, but the one
most crucial to LAPP was from 1953 to 1955. Herbert A. Deane
officer’s diary, 1952–1953, RG 12.1; RFA, RAC. Although Deane,
Stewart, and Willits solicited the advice of a number of eminent
theorists from 1952 through 1955, they made most LAPP policy
themselves.
9 The Grant Actions that renewed appropriations to the SSRC for
this program (RF 57102, May 23, 1957 and RF 60133, June 24, 1960,
both in folder 2470, box 255, series 200E, RG 1.2, RFA, RAC) no
longer highlight the conflict between political philosophy and social
science. In subsequent references, material from this series is cited
as RAC-2.
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about the proposed LAPP fellowship program, most
likely because they were aware of the criticisms of social science on which it was based: “some SSRC staff
members and some directors were opposed to acceptance of the Foundation grant, on the grounds that philosophy and social science research were quite different
things” (JBS [John B. Stewart] interview notes from a
meeting with Board of Directors, SSRC, September
13 and 14, 1954, p. 1, 2470: 255, RAC-2.). Stewart attended a meeting of the SSRC’s Board of Directors
in September of 1954 expecting defiance and opposition. But ultimately, the SSRC did not balk; instead, its
Board appointed an advisory committee to discuss the
criteria for how “political theory” ought to be defined
for the purpose of making awards.
These records of the early years of LAPP reveal that
the Foundation’s officers and consultants crafted the
program as a response to what they regarded as largescale and worrisome changes in the social sciences. For
one, they were worried about how other funders were
allocating their money and how this was fueling change
in the social sciences; the decision to induce the SSRC
to administer part of the program in political theory
arose out of these concerns.10 Once the creators of
LAPP made their case for political theory by positing
it as a counterweight to certain strains of social science,
however, they had to confront the practical, definitional question implicit in that case: which approaches
to political theory work best as counterweights to social
science? That is, to which approaches to political theory
should LAPP give most of its support?

“POLITICAL THEORY” AS A CATEGORY IN
THE 1950s
These questions were daunting ones, mainly because
“political theory” was such a large and porous category
in the 1950s. Not only did a wide range of work fit
into it, but also it permitted dual citizenship, in the
sense that belonging to it did not exclude one from
belonging to other fields at the same time. Both of these
features made the practical task of defining what ought
to count as “political theory” more difficult. Moreover,
the disagreements over what ought to count as political
theory were not confined to where its outer boundaries
lay; people also disagreed over how to characterize
prototypical examples of the field. The core of political
theory was as deeply contested as its periphery.
To see how large a category political theory was in
the 1950s, consider the variety of projects that won
support from the Rockefeller Foundation’s LAPP programs. Among those established scholars who received
LAPP grants-in-aid for work in political theory were
Gordon Tullock (for mathematical models of political
choice), Henry Kissinger (for a theory of international
affairs), Allan Bloom and Leo Strauss (for studies of
10 Dean Rusk, President of the Rockefeller Foundation, advised
Willits, head of DSS, to “‘tip his hat’ to the fact that the Ford Foundation is in the field” when making his case for funding LAPP to the
foundation’s board of directors (Willits interview notes with Dean
Rusk, March 9, 1953, 76: 8, RAC-1).
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the ancient roots of modern Western values), Herbert
Storing (for a reconsideration of theories of public
administration), Herbert McClosky (for an empirical
study of the psychology of political extremism) and
Hannah Arendt (for “a basic study of the theory of politics”).11 The range of projects supported by the SSRCadministered LAPP program for advanced graduate
students was similarly broad; while there were more
studies in the history of political thought than in any
other broadly defined subject area, students also received fellowships for work on contemporary political
issues, American or European social science, legal theory, theories of international relations, and the application of mathematical techniques to political issues
(Committee on Political Theory and Legal Philosophy Fellowships, Report on the Fellowship Program,
1954–55–1962–1963, n.d., 2472:255, RAC-2). Judging
solely by the range of grants made, those who made
LAPP grants did not reject all projects with an affinity
for social science; instead, they worked with a broad,
even eclectic conception of what counted as “political
theory.”
In addition to being a broad category, political theory
in the 1950s was a porous one. From our perspective
today, among the most notable of those members of
the discipline who held “dual citizenship” in political
theory and another field were William Riker, Herbert
McClosky, and John Wahlke.12 The fields of the discipline being defined as they are today, few would identify any of these scholars (with the possible exception of
Riker, sometimes called a “formal theorist”) primarily
or even secondarily as political theorists. Yet in the
1950s, each asserted his identity as a political theorist
in ways that were accepted by others in the discipline,
even as he also forged ties with other fields.
Another sign of how porous the field was can be
found in how some scholars who seem associated with
political theory exclusively sometimes made strategic forays outside it or had their work described in
terms one would expect to have reserved for “dual
citizens.” An example of the former would be the Ford
Foundation’s Behavioral Sciences Division’s sponsorship of a project supervised by Leo Strauss for an
11 All citations are to LAPP Grant Actions from series 200S, RG
1.2, unless otherwise indicated. Citations are abbreviated as follows: grant action number (recipient name), date approved, folder
number: box number. SS 6007 (Gordon Tullock), May 4, 1961,
5083:594; SS 5458 (Henry Kissinger), May 24, 1954, 4092:344, RG 1.1;
SS 5740 (Allan Bloom), May 24, 1957, 4885:570; SS 5734 (Leo
Strauss), May 15, 1957, 4923:575; SS 5937 (Herbert Storing), March
24, 1959, 4922:575; SS 5831 (Herbert McClosky), March 24, 1958,
5015:586; SS 6019 (Hannah Arendt), February 23, 1960, 4170: 487.
12 Both Riker and McClosky received funding both from LAPP
(Grant Action SS 5519 to Riker, approved April 25, 1955, 4529:529,
series 200S, RG 1.2; Grant Action SS 5831 to McClosky in 1958)
and from the SSRC’s Committees on National Security Policy Research (SSRC Annual Report 1956, 79—
–Riker) and Political Behavior (SSRC Annual Report 1957, 65—–McClosky) around the same
time. Wahlke is mentioned by one participant in the first meeting of
the SSRC’s Advisory Committee for LAPP as an example of an “interdisciplinary” scholar, in the sense that he was trained in political
theory but learned behavioral methods (JBS notes on Conference on
Legal Philosophy and Political Theory, SSRC, November 20, 1954,
p. 2, 2470:255, RAC-2).
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“analysis of relations between political theory and
empirical research” (Ford Foundation Annual Report
1956, 56). An internal document from the Rockefeller
Foundation illustrates the latter; its author summarizes
Sheldon Wolin’s early work on what was to become
Politics and Vision (1960) as being about “public opinion in democracy” (Thompson to Rusk, November 28,
1958, p. 1, 80: 9, RAC-1).
The point is not that these characterizations reveal
some authentic aspect of these scholars’ work that
current disciplinary divisions are likely to make us miss.
Rather, the way “political theory” worked as a category
in the discipline in the 1950s allowed one to call scholars
like Riker and McClosky political theorists even while
acknowledging that the former was developing formal,
mathematical theories of politics and the latter was
closely tied to the emerging behavioralist movement.
That is not to say that everyone in the discipline would
have accepted calling Riker and McClosky political
theorists in the 1950s; some pointedly did not.13 Still,
it is a vivid indicator of disciplinary change that the
claim, “Herbert McClosky is a political theorist,”once
contestable but eminently defensible, sounds like a
classification error today.

POLITICAL THEORY AND ITS OTHERS
Academics often specify what it is they do by showing how their work is distinct from what gets done
in contiguous, but to their minds separate, academic
territories (Becher and Trowler 2001; Brown 2002). Indeed, an important part of how one understands one’s
intellectual identity may lie in one’s choice of academic
“others,” those fields to which one pointedly says one
does not belong. What sorts of qualities one attributes
to these others may vary a great deal—–one may portray them as fundamentally muddled and obtuse or just
specifically deaf to what one finds intellectually engaging. But no matter how great the variety of attributes
one might assign to them, they all share one: potency.
When one appeals to others in order to flesh out one’s
own intellectual identity, one emphasizes how strong is
the tide against which one must swim or how cramped
the space available for one’s contribution betwixt and
between those that are well established. One may read
the power one attributes to one’s intellectual others as
malicious or not - but powerful they must be.
Though a common enough feature of academic discourse, scholars can of course specify their identity
without using an intellectual other as a foil. So how
ought we to read the presence or absence of intellectual
others in how academics identify what they do? As I
have suggested above, to present another approach as
an other is to recognize it—–and to recognize it as powerful. The converse of identity-through-opposition might
13 For instance, at the initial meeting of the SSRC’s Advisory Committee for LAPP fellowships, one member (Frederick Watkins) explicitly rejected an inclusive definition of political theory as practically useless: “If behaviorism is political theory, then all political
scientists are political theorists” (JBS notes on Conference on Legal
Philosophy and Political Theory, November 20, 1954, SSRC, p. 2,
RAC–2).
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be called identity-through-accommodation, where the
point is to combine, unify, and even fuse what appear
to be differing approaches. In the first meeting of the
Advisory Committee for the SSRC’s LAPP fellowship
program, one finds examples of both of these presentations of academic identity.
Without naming the proponents, the minutes for
this meeting summarize arguments for several differing
approaches to political theory—–the empirical, the historical, and the eclectic—–each with distinct standards
for awarding fellowships. Only the defenders of the
empirical approach explicated what they did by citing an approach to which theirs was opposed—–namely,
“morally oriented theory.” By contrast, those who advocated the historical approach pointedly refused to
designate an intellectual other and rejected any attempt to oppose their approach to the empirical one.
And as its name suggests, the eclectic approach sought
to incorporate variety rather than to posit others (the
only plausible one of which, again by definition, was
specialization; Minutes of the Conference on Legal and
Political Philosophy, SSRC, November 20, 1954, pp. 2–
6, 2470:255, RAC-2).
Once these various approaches were presented,
however, the committee declined to choose one in
particular—–thereby de facto opting for the eclectic approach (Minutes, pp. 11–12). Following suit, the SSRC
decided against using the phrase “empirical theory”
in its announcement of the new program, apparently
on the view that the phrase would be read as an invitation only to those who accepted this particular approach (SSRC brochure, “Announcement of Fellowships, Grants-in-Aid, and other Appointments to be
offered in 1955,” pp. 11–12, 2470:255, RAC-2).
Another account of the same meeting, written by
John Stewart, consultant to Rockefeller for LAPP,
highlights several disagreements among the participants and, unlike the Minutes discussed above, makes
clear who said what. First, although several participants
(David Easton and Earl Latham) identified “moral theory” and “metaphysics” as the opposites of the kind
of political theory they argued the SSRC ought to support, others (most notably Herbert Deane and Norman
Jacobson) objected that defining the program this way
would amount to requiring all fellows to accept doing
theory along behaviorist lines, even if they were disinclined to do so. This dispute over the implications of
the particular identity-through-opposition presented
by Easton and Latham unfolded within an even more
fundamental disagreement about the disciplinary milieu in which political theory should be placed. Again,
Easton and Latham argued that because political theory is properly located within the social sciences, the
recipients of the SSRC’s LAPP fellowships ought to
be encouraged to seek training in the social sciences
and in mathematics. But Deane, Jacobson, and Stewart
objected that making such training a prerequisite for
LAPP fellowships would erase the distinction between
this program and other more explicitly social scientific programs administered by the SSRC. And Deane
also countered that the fields of “[h]istory, philosophy
and law are perhaps more important” to enhancing the
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training of LAPP fellows than the social sciences (JBS
interview notes, November 20, 1954, pp. 1–4, 67).
In both of these accounts, the advocates of “empirical theory” identified their approach in a strikingly
different way than those advocating other approaches.
Only the advocates of “empirical theory” consistently
identified their approach by citing ways of doing theory to which they were opposed; other participants,
though clearly critical of the empirical approach, declined to present what they advocated in opposition to
it. Instead, they sought to incorporate empirical theory,
arguing that there was room enough in how they conceived of the field to accommodate empirical theorists,
albeit not in a central location. Such a response to the
challenge posed by early advocates of the empirical
approach was, I believe, both an acknowledgment of its
growing significance and a move intended to contain
it. By declining to posit empirical theorists as their others, advocates of the historical or eclectic approaches
to political theory attempted to make what “political
theory” meant even broader without ceding any of its
vital territory to the empirical theorists. The empirical
theorists, on the other hand, consistently defined themselves in opposition to an other, highlighting the power
of the kinds of theory that stood in their way.

CONCLUSION
Political theory was anything but dead in the 1950s;
even those who were critical of the field were more
likely to see it as misguided than moribund. Instead,
it was a broad, porous field that was changing rapidly,
in large part because political science as a whole was
being transformed by the sudden availability of large
external grants. When the Rockefeller Foundation began its LAPP program in the early 1950s, its officers
explicitly meant the work it funded to act as a counterweight to the growing power of social science in the
study of politics. But in the first few years of its life,
LAPP became a program that accommodated social
scientific approaches to political theory rather than one
that consistently opposed them. The eclectic working
definition of political theory that came to characterize
all phases of LAPP made room for what the creators
of the program had initially intended to oppose.14
What, then, did LAPP mean for the later development of political theory? Some might argue that the
accommodationist strategy ultimately adopted by the
Foundation toward empirical theory was a mistake, insofar as it sustained this approach without offering a
clear alternative to it. Regardless of how one judges the
merits of the eclectic approach to political theory that
came to dominate LAPP, the program’s $1.7 million did
support a good deal of work in political theory over the
14 Beginning in 1957, DSS solicited comments from a wide variety of
academics on the LAPP program and then arranged excerpts from
them by category. The category, “Comments on the Present Scope
of the Program,” contained only one sub-heading: “Its eclectic character.” Not all respondents praised this quality of the program, but
no one questioned that the program was eclectic (Critical Comments
on LAPP Program, 1958, p. 3, 80:9, RAC-1).
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course of its ten year life—–some of which would later
be cited as part of the revival of political theory in the
late 1960s and 1970s. Additionally, being drawn into the
work of policy- and grant-making stirred a new kind of
consciousness in those academics suddenly called upon
to define their field for purposes that clearly mattered
to them, their colleagues, and their students. For those
who participated in it, LAPP provided immediate and
powerful incentives to think about what defined political theory as a field and what its place in political
science and the social sciences should be.
The reasons why political theory became a highly isolated sub-field within political science in the latter half
of the twentieth century are bigger than anything that
began within LAPP (Gunnell 1993). But during its brief
life, LAPP offered a forum for the wide variety of scholars who identified themselves as political theorists to articulate their conception of their field and to argue with
those who thought differently. The self-consciousness
that LAPP fostered proved fractious, and the eclectic
conception of political theory the program fashioned,
loosely knit; by the mid-1960s, it was already visibly
frayed. Still, LAPP kept political theory alive at a time
when other fields had access to far greater sums. It also
gave political theorists an ongoing opportunity to think
about where what they were doing fit in their rapidly
changing discipline.
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